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DEFENCE

OF

Natural and Revealed
RELIGION:

OCCASIONED

By Mr. CHUBB'S SCRIPTURE
EVIDENCE Considered, in a View
of the Controversy betwixt himself
and Mr. *Barclay's* Defenders.

IN A

Second Letter to a FRIEND.

By THOMAS MORGAN, M.D.

LONDON:

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S I R,



THE Controversy between Mr. Chubb and me, on the account of Mr. Barclay's Scheme, as relating to Man's common Fall in *Adam*, and Restoration by Jesus Christ, is now so far brought to an Issue, that he has fairly stated the Question, and frankly made himself accountable for one single Proposition,

upon which the whole Debate must depend ; which is so uncommon a thing in an Adversary, that I must needs thank Mr. *Chubb* for it, even while he is loading me with the vilest Aspersions he could cast upon me, by supposing, as he does, that I am, from some ungenerous private selfish View or other, defending a Doctrine contrary to my real Judgment and inward Persuasion. This is doubtless the worst Character, and most odious Light, in which it is possible to represent a Man : but Mr. *Chubb*, I suppose, thought it more civil and agreeable to call one Knave than Fool ; at which however I shall not complain, because I find he does not love to be complain'd of, and upon any such occasion would presently cry out that he is abused. But I shall easily forgive him his effeminate Tenderness, and Impatience of Contradiction, provided he can but find in his Heart to forgive me the Presumption of differing from him, till he can offer me some farther and more convincing Proof.

I H A D distinguished between natural and moral Agency, and prov'd that one might subsist without the other, and that, consequently, they must be very different and distinct Things. Now Mr. *Chubb*, being willing if possible to please me, allows this Distinction thus far, that where natural and moral Agency subsist in different Subjects, they must be quite different and distinct Things ; but where they subsist together in one and the same Subject, (which is the Case in Man) they must be one and the same Thing. And the Reason, it seems, why he did not make this Distinction before, was, because there could be no need
of

of it: for by *moral Agent* he means *intelligent Agent*, and therefore Man being, by the necessity of his Nature and Constitution, an *intelligent Agent*, must consequently be a *moral Agent*. But for my part, I was so simple as to imagine, that every *Agent* must be an *intelligent Agent*, and that an *unintelligent Agent* must be something purely *unintelligible*. This was my silly Conceit, and I could never have thought otherwise, if Mr. Chubb had not demonstrated the contrary. I never expected indeed to have been thrown upon the Distinction between intelligent and unintelligent Agency, and much less to have been told that this is the true Distinction between natural and moral Agency; but the World we see grows every day wiser and wiser, and we may shortly expect some very extraordinary Demonstrations. But perhaps Mr. Chubb, in his next Letter, may find it to his purpose to distinguish farther between *intelligent Agency* and *intelligent Agency*; and to tell us, that by *moral Agency* he means only that sort of *intelligent Agency* which is the natural necessary Result of the *human Constitution*, and not any other sort of intelligent Agency, which may possibly subsist in different Subjects, or in the same Subject at different Times, and under different Circumstances, as separate and distinct from *moral Agency*. That is, by *moral Agency*, he does not mean *intelligent Agency*, but *moral Agency*, which is a very different and distinct thing from *intelligent Agency*. It seems to me therefore, that in Mr. Chubb's account *natural Agency* must be distinct from *moral Agency*; and yet 'tis impossible there should be any such Distinction at all, at least in Man, who is the Subject

Subject now under Consideration. But this 'tis to deal only upon Axioms and first Principles, and never to undertake the Demonstration of any thing, but what being self evident before, must consequently be incapable of any farther Proof : which is the way doubtless to be very clear or very impertinent.

Mr. *CHUBB* makes this Distinction between natural and moral Liberty, to be of the same Nature with the Distinction between *Certainty* and *absolute Certainty*, which distinction he supposes to be mine : But the whole World about us are my Witnesses, that I have never made any such Distinction at all. I have indeed distinguished between *proper*, i.e. *absolute Certainty*, and those other degrees of Probability below it, which some Men in a general, loose, and popular way of speaking, call *Certainty* : But Mr *Chubb* 'tis plain in this Case wanted some lucky hit, and I think 'tis as plain, that he has had the ill luck to fail of it. But not to insist upon this insignificant *Sneer*, in which Mr. *Chubb* has been a little unhappy, I think 'tis evident, that he must either suppose mere thoughtless unintelligent Matter to be free and active, or else he must distinguish with respect to intelligent Agency, and prove that Man as Man, or as the necessary Result of the human Constitution, abstracting from all Interposition of Providence, or divine Aids and Influences whatever, must have that sort of intelligent Agency, which is sufficient to qualify him to work Righteousness, and to obtain eternal Life, without any particular Communications from God. Indeed he tells us with a very dogmatical Air, that he has demonstrated

demonstrated this already; that I must needs be satisfied with the Proof; and that he cannot believe me to be sincere while I pretend to doubt of it.—*Man as Man*, or as the natural necessary Result of the human Constitution, without any particular Grace, or Communication of *Light* and *rational Motives* from *God*, is sufficiently qualify'd and enabled to work Righteousness, and obtain the divine Favour, or eternal Life and Happiness; and to suppose the contrary, is to overthrow and to set aside the Scripture as a divine Revelation, by charging it with a Principle that is in it self false, impossible, and contrary to the Reason and Nature of Things.

I DO not here quote him Verbatim, as being sure that he cannot charge me with misrepresenting him; and whoever will be at the Pains of reading over his *Scripture Evidence considered*, must see that this is the very Point that he has made himself accountable for. My Case however, as you may observe, must be a little hard: for if I should *debate the matter* farther with him, he will say that I am not sincere in the Argument, and that I am sufficiently convinced already, whatever I may pretend to the contrary; and if I *should not*, other People may be apt to look upon the Point as given up, and consequently take Mr. Chubb's *Dogmatism* for *real Evidence*.

BUT in order to clear the Account depending between Mr. Chubb and me, it will be proper to consider a little more distinctly his main Principle, and to enquire, whether his *Philosophical Scheme*, must not be liable to the same, or equal Difficulties and Objections with Mr. Barclay's *Theological Scheme*? Whether
Barclay

Barclay and his Adherents have ever deny'd that sort of Liberty *Mr. Chubb* maintains ; or ever asserted any other *Necessity* of *Action* but what *Mr. Chubb* himself, upon his own Principles, must allow ? And if upon this Enquiry it should appear, that he has hitherto proceeded upon a wrong Supposition, and charged his Adversaries with Absurdity, Contradiction, Obstinacy, Insincerity, &c. only for want of understanding them ; I shall now endeavour to give him an opportunity to inform himself better, and to ground his Imputations for the future, upon a somewhat more reasonable Foundation. To which purpose, it will be necessary to settle the meaning of certain Terms, which frequently occur, and upon the precise signification of which this whole Debate must depend.

BY *Natural Agency*, or Liberty, therefore, I mean the Principle of *Self-Determination*, or the Power of acting or not acting, willing or nilling, chusing or refusing, free from all external Force, Coaction, or Violence whatever. Wherever a thing depends upon Will or Choice, there will be natural *Agency*, or *Liberty*; but where the thing does not depend upon Will or Choice, there can be no Agency at all, but physical Necessity, or mere passive Recipieny must take Place. And where a thing is thus physically necessary, the contrary is said to be physically impossible, or impossible with respect to the bare abstract Idea of *physical Power*. But then, where Agency is considered as necessarily connected with Intelligence, which indeed must be always the Case in Fact ; that which is considered, and spoken of, as possible, with respect to the bare physical

physical abstract Idea of Power, may be impossible and contradictory, where Power is considered as connected with *Intelligence*; that is, it may be incompatible with the Idea of *intelligent Agency*, and consequently, impossible to an intelligent Agent. To make this clear, let it be considered, that Pleasure or Happiness, as appearing to the Understanding, is the necessary Object of Desire and Choice, and Pain or Misery is the necessary Object of Aversion and Refusal to every intelligent Being. Or which is the same thing, every intelligent Being must necessarily desire, will, and chuse Pleasure or Happiness, and necessarily hate, nill, and refuse Pain or Misery considered as such, or as thus appearing to the Understanding. Now in this sense, it will be impossible for an intelligent Being to chuse Evil or to refuse Good, as thus appearing, because it must imply this Contradiction, that such a Being does and does not desire Pleasure or Happiness, and that he has and has not, a natural necessary Aversion to Pain or Misery at the same time, and under the same appearance. If Mr. *Chubb* will say, that this does not imply a Contradiction with respect to the bare abstract Idea of Power, Force or Strength, I grant it; but if he will say, that it does not imply a Contradiction to the complex Idea, where Power is connected with Intelligence, I must desire him to prove it.

I SUPPOSE he will allow, that this natural necessary Desire of Happiness, and Aversion to Misery, considered as such, cannot be the Ground of any moral Distinction at all; for this being in common, by a natural

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Necessity,

Necessity, to all intelligent Beings alike, cannot possibly distinguish the Good from the Bad, the Virtuous from the Vitious.

A N D it must be here considered, that this necessary Desire and Choice of Happiness, and Aversion to, or Refusal of Misery, in all the practical Determinations of intelligent Beings, cannot depend upon the real Truth of Propositions, in the abstract Nature and Reason of Things, but must always depend upon Mens Judgments concerning them, be they right or wrong. That is, he who apprehends a thing as necessarily connected with his own Happiness, will necessarily desire, chuse, and prefer it; and he who apprehends the same thing as necessarily connected with his own personal Misery, will as necessarily shun and avoid it, whether his Judgment be right or wrong. But the Judgment in this Case, I suppose Mr. *Chubb* will allow to be necessary, as the natural necessary Effect of the Appearances and Impressions of Objects. Upon which Supposition I think 'tis very plain, that he has left no Ground or Room at all for moral Liberty in his Scheme. And I shall farther prove, that what he talks of *natural Liberty*, or the bare abstract physical Power of acting or not acting, can be of no use at all to him in the present Case. I know it has been lately declar'd, that the Expression *necessary Agent* implies a Contradiction. And no doubt but it is so, where the word *Necessity* refers to external Coaction or Violence; because in this Case there could be no Action at all, but the supposed Agent would be a mere passive Sufferer only. But notwithstanding this, a Person may be truly and properly

properly a *necessary Agent* by the internal Nature, Reason and Necessity of the thing it self. And the Power and Liberty of acting, free from Compulsion and Violence, cannot be at all inconsistent with this. The Power and Liberty of willing and chusing natural Evil, Pain or Misery, and of nilling and refusing natural Good, Pleasure or Happiness, considered as such, or as thus appearing to the Understanding, seems to me but an odd Foundation to build Morality upon; and yet this Liberty of acting contrary to all the possible Motives, Grounds and Reasons of Action in intelligent Beings, is what Mr. *Chubb* insists upon as natural to Man, and the necessary Result of the human Constitution: and he charges Mr. *Barclay*, my self, and others, with vast and infinite Absurdities and Contradictions for supposing the contrary, while he compliments himself with having only asserted and maintain'd what is Self-Evident. Now I shall not here presume to determine where the Defect lies, but certainly there must be some great Defect or other, either in *his* Understanding or *mine*, with respect to the Knowledge of intelligent Nature, and the *human Constitution*.

THE natural Power and Liberty of chusing Misery, and refusing Happiness, considered as such, is, I suppose, just as good Sense, and just as possible, as the natural Desire of Misery and Aversion to Happiness. And if Mr. *Chubb* will free his own Scheme from this Absurdity, and show that his Reason and Philosophy is not more contradictory and self-inconsistent than Mr. *Barclay's* *Scripture* and *Theology*; he must, I believe, advance

something still farther, which he seems not yet to have thought of, or he must for once suffer himself to be an *Author*, and not always content himself with being only an *Echo*.

THE natural Necessity of acting, independent of Will or Choice, by external Force or Coaction, as impell'd by some other Agent; is the infinite Absurdity that Mr. *Chubb* has found out in Mr. *Barclay*. But surely he must be infinitely positive who can suppose this to have been the opinion of Mr. *Barclay*, or any other Man living. And therefore as often as Mr. *Chubb* will go on dogmatically to assert this Opinion as *Barclay's*, he must be told that his Assertion is false, and his Imputation thereupon groundless and abusive.

BUT perhaps this Principle may be farther clear'd up, and better understood by applying it to God himself. And here Mr. *Chubb* supposes, that God has the natural Power and Liberty of acting contrary to the *Nature and Reason of Things*, i. e. contrary to his own *Nature*. God has such a Power and Liberty of acting, that he may as well do Evil as Good, and act wickedly as righteously. Which being once supposed, I would fain know how Mr. *Chubb* can prove that this is not really so in Fact, that God has not hitherto done as much, or more Evil than Good, and that he will not do the same for all time to come? Perhaps he will say that this is very improbable: grant it, but yet the thing may be true for all that. That God can do no Injury or Wrong, that he cannot punish us beyond our Deserts, and that he cannot deceive, betray and ruin us
by

by proving false to his Word and Promises, and acting contrary to his natural necessary Perfections, is what above all things one would desire a Demonstration of. And if Mr. *Chubb* cannot demonstrate this, his other Demonstrations and *Self-evident Propositions* about moral Agency, the Nature of Man, and the necessary Result of the human Constitution, can be of no use to us at all. And yet I think 'tis plain, that this is what Mr. *Chubb* cannot demonstrate, or be certain of, upon his own Principles. For since Certainty to the Understanding is nothing else but the perceived Necessity of the Thing, or the perceived Impossibility of the contrary; if God be at Liberty in this Case, and may act contrary to his natural necessary Perfections, I think Mr. *Chubb*, nor any one else, can demonstrate or make it certain, that he has not, does not, or will not do it. It cannot be demonstrated upon this Principle, that there is any such Being as a God, or wise and righteous Governour of the World. God indeed may govern the World in Wisdom and Righteousness if he will; but he may as well do otherwise, and be infinitely more injurious and mischievous than the Devil himself, if he please, as being infinitely stronger. And this being once supposed as possible, it can never be demonstrated or made certain, that it is not, or will not be so in Fact; since to demonstrate a Thing, is only to prove the Necessity of that Thing, or to shew the Impossibility of the contrary. In this Scheme therefore it must depend upon the Will and Pleasure of the supreme Being, whether he will be the most kind, merciful and beneficent;

cent; or most cruel, implacable and mischievous of all Beings: that is, whether he will be *God*, in the proper Sense of the *Word*, or a most dreadful omnipotent and irresistible *Devil*. And which of these he will in Fact be, must in this way depend upon a *Chance*, concerning which there can be no possible *Certainty*. And is not this a fine Principle of Trust and Confidence in God, a firm Basis for *Religion*, and a glorious Encouragement to *Virtue*? Upon this main Principle of Mr. *Chubb's*, not only Calvinism, Popery, Mahometism, but even Paganism and Diabolism it self may be justified, as not at all inconsistent, or incompatible, in the Nature and Reason of Things, with any of the *necessary* Attributes and Perfections of God. And how desperately obstinate and utterly inexcusable therefore must the *Quakers* be, if notwithstanding this plain Evidence against them, they should continue to be *Quakers* still?

NATURAL and moral Agency, which (with Mr. *Chubb*) is the same thing in Man, and all intelligent Agents must consist, according to him, in the Power and Liberty of acting or not acting, of willing or nilling, chusing or refusing, upon all such Motives, Grounds and Reasons of Action as may be present to the Mind, which must necessarily imply the Power and Liberty of acting contrary to all such Motives, Grounds and Reasons of Action as may be present to the Mind. Now upon this Supposition, all the Actions of Mankind, and of the whole intelligent Creation, must be uncertain and precarious even to God himself. God as well as we, may know what will happen after the thing

thing is past, but he can never know what Men or Angels will do till the Event informs him. And from hence it will follow, that God by Observation and Experience, must continually grow and increase in Knowledge and Understanding as Men do. He knows innumerable things now, that he could not have known forty Years ago; and a few Years hence he will be much wiser or more knowing than he is now. And this, how harsh soever it may sound, is, as I conceive, a necessary Consequence from Mr. Chubb's *Self-evident* Principles. From hence it must likewise follow, that God has made Creatures that he cannot govern, and that in the Nature and Reason of the Thing, are incapable of any moral Government at all. I do not mean that they may not be rewarded and punished, or that they may not be affected with Pleasure and Pain according to the Will of the Governour; for their being intelligent and self-conscious, must render them capable of that. But what I mean is, that no Rewards or Punishments can be proposed or apply'd to them that will have any certain good Effect. Any Rewards or Punishments, Promises or Threatnings, that can be proposed or apply'd in this Scheme, may do more Harm than Good; and instead of making such Creatures more kind, beneficent, and useful, may, on the contrary, make them more cruel, mischievous and hurtful, so as to defeat the End and Design of all Creation and Government. And as this must be a possible Evil as much as the contrary Good, so 'tis what the Creator cannot prevent without destroying his own Work, or governing such Creatures upon
some

some other Principles inconsistent with their Natures. Let the material World be supposed subject to no certain Laws for the Impression and Communication of Motion; let Bodies be so indifferent to all Determinations, that if an Impulse be given them to one Point, they might as well move in the contrary Direction; and 'tis evident that in this Case, all must be wild Confusion, no Order could be observ'd, nor any good End obtain'd. And it must be the same thing, if the intellectual World should be exempted from the necessary Laws of Reason, and intelligent Beings, contrary to the Nature and Reason of the Thing, left to an arbitrary Power and Liberty to will and chuse indifferently, either natural Good or Evil, Happiness or Misery, Pleasure or Pain, consider'd as such, or thus appearing to the Understanding. Upon which Hypothesis, Truth and Falshood must in Effect be the same thing, and a Man might well pursue and obtain Happiness upon a wrong Judgment about it, as well as upon a right one.

P E R H A P S all this put together, may give Mr. *Chubb* some faint Idea, or imperfect Conception of the Possibility at least, of a necessary Determination either to *Good* or to *Evil*, without the contradictory Supposition of Coaction or Compulsion, and in a way perfectly consistent with *Action*, i. e. with *Will* or *Choice*. And if it should appear from the Nature of Things, that this not only may, but must be so; what will become of all Mr. *Chubb's* Demonstrations from the Nature of Man, and the necessary Result of the human Constitution? Where will be his necessary
Qualifications

Qualifications for divine Revelation? where his great Pretensions to self-evident Truth and Reason against *Barclay* and the Quakers? and in short, where will be the Ground of all his Confidence and Triumph? But here 'twill probably be demanded, If all this be so, wherein then does the Liberty of human Actions consist? or what is the true Ground of Rewards and Punishments under a State of Trial? To which I reply in the first place, that if I should leave this matter as insoluble, and own it as an insuperable Difficulty, it could not in the least affect the Question between Mr. *Chubb* and me; unless he could defend his own Notion of Liberty, and shew how it can be brought into any moral Account, or be made the Foundation of Virtue or Vice, Praise and Blame, Rewards and Punishments; which I am pretty sure he is not able to do. But not to stop here, I shall take leave to make some farther Observations upon this Subject. I observe then, 2dly, with respect to the Import of the Words, *Virtue* and *Vice*, that they are apply'd in common use to all the Qualities and Affections of intelligent Beings, as they are beneficial or hurtful, or as they naturally tend to procure either Happiness or Misery to Mankind. Thus we talk of virtuous and vitious Tempers, Dispositions, Affections and Passions, as well as of virtuous and vitious *Actions*. In Consequence of this, one Man shall be praised for a kind beneficent compassionate Temper, and another will be blam'd for the contrary, tho these should in both be the mere Effects of their different natural Constitutions, and not at all depending upon any Will or Choice. And in this

Case I think 'tis plain, that Rewards and Punishments, or the Application of Pleasure and Pain, will be always right and reasonable, so far as they are necessary to prevent or cure any evil mischievous *Passions*, as much as if they were apply'd to prevent mischievous *Actions*. Pleasure and Pain have the same natural Effects upon all sensible Creatures, whether they are commonly supposed and allow'd to be moral Agents or not. Any Punishment therefore that is necessary to prevent a greater Evil, will be right and reasonable, whether the Creature thus punish'd be suppos'd to be free or not free. And the inflicting of any Pain or Punishment at all, upon any Beings beyond this, can never be an Act of Justice, but must always be consider'd under the Notion of personal Revenge, or *pure Malice*. And from hence, I think, 'tis evident, that just Punishment, or the reasonable Application of Pain, as a necessary means to prevent a greater Evil, can have no relation at all to the common Questions about Liberty, free Will, and moral Agency: since while Punishment is necessary to such an End, it must needs be right and reasonable, whether the Subject it is apply'd to be free or not, and upon any other Supposition it can never be justify'd at all.

I KNOW there is some Spice or Tincture of Malice and Revenge in most Men, and therefore in their Moral and Religious Schemes they would willingly make room for it. But whether it be, upon the whole, for the Good of Mankind or no, perhaps might deserve some farther Consideration. For my part I take it to be some Remains of the evil Seed,

Seed, or Seed of the Serpent, which neither Grace nor good Nature have yet quite eradicated. 'Tis a Tare sown in the Field of our Hearts, which if it could be done without hurting the good Wheat, I should think ought to be pluck'd up. But,

3dly, T O come a little nearer to the Point in Hand; I take moral Liberty to consist in the Non-Invincibility of moral Error; or in Mens having sufficient Instruction, Opportunities, and Advantages, to inform themselves aright concerning the true Nature of Happiness, and the means of attaining it. Upon this Account Men are always considered as more or less criminal or faulty, in Proportion to the different Light they are under, and different Opportunities and Advantages they are favoured with in order to a right Information. And hence the same Actions may be either Criminal or Innocent, Faulty or Blameless, to different Persons, or to the same Persons at different Times, under different Circumstances, and in a different Position of Objects to their Understandings. A Man's Judgment concerning his own Happiness, and the necessary means of obtaining it, taken altogether or every thing consider'd, is what I here call his moral *Judgment*; because in his whole moral Conduct, he must necessarily govern, direct and determine himself by his Judgment as thus considered.

N O W as a Man's moral Judgment may be either right or wrong; so where it is wrong, his Error may be vincible or invincible, that is, he may have sufficient Light, Opportunities, and Advantages, to correct and rectify such an Error, and to inform himself

right in this Case or not. If he has sufficient Means and Opportunities to inform himself right in this great Point, he will be morally free, and may be justly punished in the moral Sense, for any Neglect, Inattention, or want of Consideration, where the proper Means, Objects and Opportunities are before him. But if he wants those necessary Means and Opportunities for a right Information in the present Case, the Man's moral Liberty will be lost, and he cannot be accountable in the moral Sense, for any such necessary invincible Ignorance or Error. If it should be here said, that Men cannot, while they are rational, at all be ignorant and mistaken, at least not necessarily and invincibly so, about the Reason and Fitness of moral Actions, which is the only true ground of moral Conduct: I answer, that Men do not, and cannot determine themselves upon any Abstract Nature and Reason of Things, against their own Happiness, considered as such and upon the whole. That is, they cannot chuse Misery and refuse Happiness as such, upon any pretended Reason and Fitness of Things.

IF it should be urged farther, that Men cannot in any Cases, or under any possible Circumstances, be invincibly mistaken about Happiness and the necessary means to it; I should have a Right to demand the Proof of this, but because I am satisfy'd that no such thing can be prov'd: If Mr. *Chubb* should insist upon it farther, I will undertake at any Time to prove the contrary.

THIS might possibly have pass'd as a sufficient Reply to Mr. *Chubb*, so far as I am concern'd with him in Defence of Mr. *Barclay*,
and

and in which as I take it, I have been at the same time defending both Scripture and Reason. But as he has started some other incidental Difficulties and Objections, perhaps he might think himself slighted, if I should not pay him a very particular Regard.

Mr. *CHUBB* then, *p. 3.* states my Notion thus, " By natural Liberty I understand the Doctor means, that Man in the Fall, without supervening Grace, has Power and is at Liberty to *Act*, or *not to Act*, from such Motives as are present to his Mind ; that he has Power, and is at Liberty either to follow or to controul his Appetites, Passions, and the like. This is the Idea which the words (natural Liberty) convey to me. But how such Liberty will consist with Man's being absolutely subjected to the Power of his own Lust, is what I cannot conceive. Absolute Subjection in the present Case, seems to suppose, that when Passion or Appetite interpose, Man is necessarily and unavoidably carry'd on to Action independent of his own *Will* or *Choice*. But then this appears to me inconsistent with natural Liberty, and is Confusion and Contradiction ; tho possibly the Doctor, by help of some lucky Distinction, may get clear of it."

I H A V E indeed supposed, the *Simple* physical Power and Liberty of Acting or not Acting, abstracted from all the natural Motives, Grounds and Reasons of Actions ; and if this can be of any Use to Mr. *Chubb* in his Scheme, he may make the best of it. But I have never supposed the *Complex* physical Power

Power of Acting, contrary to all possible Motives, Grounds and Reasons of Action as present to the Mind. And 'tis Mr. Chubb's Business to prove, if he is able, that there is or can be any such Power and Liberty in Man, or in any other intelligent Being.

W H E N I speak of absolute Subjection in the present Case, every one who had a mind to understand me, must suppose me to mean the moral Necessity and Subjection of intelligent Agents, and not any such Necessity and Subjection as arise from external Force and Compulsion, without Will or Choice, such as Weight is to a Ballance, or a superior Strength to an Inferior in intelligent Beings.

A N *Action* independent of *Will* or *Choice*, is a Contradiction in Terms, for the Will or Choice here being the Action it self, this must be Action independent of Action, or Will and Choice, without Will and Choice. How therefore this should *seem* to Mr. Chubb to be *my Meaning*, is wonderful to me! For this being, really, no Meaning at all, if he could understand nothing else by it, 'tis plain he could not understand this.

B U T Mr. Chubb it *seems* always finds it a much easier matter to misunderstand an Adversary, than it is to answer him. He has really got such a Knack of mistaking, that I am apt to think he will never understand any thing that is against him; and from hence 'tis more than a Thousand to one but he will mistake every thing that I have said now. But I cannot help Mr. Chubb's Mistakes. I must still appeal to the World about us, who possibly may not be all liable to the same Infirmary.

P. 5. Mr.

P. 5. Mr. CHUBB observes farther,
 “ By the want of moral Agency in Man, I
 “ understand the Doctor to mean, that Man
 “ in the Fall without supervening Grace, is
 “ incapable of discerning between Good and
 “ Evil in a moral Sense; that is Man, is in-
 “ capable of discerning, that to succour and
 “ relieve the Distressed, to feed the Hungry,
 “ to clothe the Naked, and the like, are Ac-
 “ tions which are kind and good, and there-
 “ fore proper for him to perform. He is in-
 “ capable of discerning that, to do as he
 “ would be done by, to make a grateful Ac-
 “ knowledgment of a Benefit receiv’d, to
 “ honour and reverence a Benefactor, and
 “ the like, are Actions which are right and
 “ fit, and therefore worthy of his Perfor-
 “ mance. He is incapable of discerning,
 “ that to slander and revile his Neighbour,
 “ to invade his Property, or to commit Adul-
 “ tery, Murder and the like, are Actions
 “ which are wrong and evil, and therefore
 “ ought to be avoided.”

TO all which I reply, that the bare ab-
 stract Nature of Things in themselves con-
 sidered, is not, and cannot be the Ground
 and Reason of moral Action, whenever by a
 wrong Judgment it is set against the greatest
 Good or Evil, Happiness or Misery on the
 other side. That is, let Happiness be placed
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 Evil or Misery, and refuse the greatest Good
 or

or Happiness, which he apprehends himself capable of. But this being, as I conceive, an impossible Choice, cannot be the Ground of any moral Obligation. Indeed it may be said in this Case, that a Man ought to enquire farther, and inform himself better, concerning his own Happiness, if he has sufficient Means and Opportunities for it; but if he has no such Means or Opportunities, he must still chuse Happiness, and refuse Misery as appearing to his Understanding, and there can be no help for it. I know it has been the Opinion of some Divine Seraphick Moralists, that bare abstract indolent Reason, without Desire or Aversion, Hope or Fear, Pleasure or Pain, or any thing else of the pathetick Kind, is the true and only ground of moral Conduct, and that no one can be properly Virtuous, who does not determine himself upon this indolent, unaffectionate or dispassionate Reason, abstracted from his own Happiness. But these Gentlemen carrying their hyperphysical Speculations beyond the real Constitution of human Nature, their metaphysical Theories have generally had the ill Luck to be look'd upon only as monastick Dreams, or Philosophical Whimsies.

BUT Mr. *Chubb* goes on, p. 6. " As this
 " is the Condition of Man in the Fall,
 " according to Dr. *Morgan*, so, according to
 " him, Man is translated out of this into
 " another State, viz. (that of moral Agency)
 " by supervening Grace; which Grace is
 " extended universally to all, tho according
 " to his first Tract, the poor *Hottentots* were
 " excepted, and according to his last Perfor-
 " mance, it is very partially administred;
 " because

“ because some Persons for want of su-
 “ pervening Grace remain in invincible Ig-
 “ norance with respect to some Points, and
 “ others the Effects of the Fall remain upon
 “ in Part. For tho they can reason justly
 “ in some Cases, yet they are mad with re-
 “ spect to others; tho they can govern and
 “ restrain their Appetites and Passions with
 “ respect to some Instances, yet those Ap-
 “ petites and Passions are invincible in o-
 “ thers, according as supervening Grace is
 “ afforded or withheld from them.”

A L L which fine Bravado is only saying
 this, that tho a common Remedy has been
 provided and put into Men's hands for a
 common Disease, yet they may lose the Bene-
 fit of this Remedy, and contract the same
 Disease again, either in whole or in part,
 according to the different Use and Improve-
 ment they make of it. But let Mr. *Chubb*
 remember, that he is to prove from the Na-
 ture of Things that this cannot possibly be
 true; which he is so far from having done
 hitherto, that methinks one could not have
 expected much less from one of my *Hotten-*
tots. But since he is so much against invin-
 cible or excusable Error, I am content that
 he should be as criminal as he can think fit.

B U T Mr. *Chubb* goes on, “ Hereby, I
 “ think, the Doctor, whether he intends it
 “ or not, is giving a most fatal Wound to
 “ Religion and Virtue, and doing such In-
 “ jury to Mankind as he may never be able
 “ to repair, by his pointing out to Men a
 “ way to excuse and justify themselves in
 “ the Practice of every Vileness. For will
 “ not every Man who follows his vicious

D

“ Incl-

“ Inclinations, be glad to have this to plead
 “ to, and for himself, *viz.* that in those
 “ Instances, in which his Actions appear to
 “ be criminal, supervening Grace was with-
 “ held from him ; that his Appetites and
 “ his Passions interposed and forced him to
 “ Action ; that it was not in his Power to
 “ restrain it, and consequently that he is
 “ wholly unaccountable in those Instances ?
 “ So that a Man may go into the vilest
 “ Actions, and yet have wherewith to ren-
 “ der his Mind perfectly easy and quiet, and
 “ be free from all Reluctancy in and after
 “ the Performance of them. And if this were
 “ the Case (which surely it is not) I cannot
 “ see how our Governours can be justify’d,
 “ in punishing those Persons that transgress
 “ the Law ; because in every such Instance,
 “ for any thing they know, supervening
 “ Grace may be withheld, invincible Ap-
 “ petite or Passion may have taken place,
 “ and it may not have been in the Person’s
 “ Power to have done otherwise. And as
 “ the Doctor will have it, that he is plead-
 “ ing the Cause of Christianity ; so I think
 “ it will be proper for him to consider what
 “ Cause he has been pleading here.”

I A M as willing to consider what I have
 been doing, as this Gentleman can be to
 put me in mind of it ; and upon the most
 serious Reflection I am capable of, I think I
 have been doing nothing but right in this
 whole Debate with Mr. Chubb.

I C A N forgive Mr. Chubb the Ill-Nature,
 and confident assuming Air of this Paragraph,
 for the sake of the Pleasantness of it, for I
 could not in reading it forbear Laughing.
 And

And if he really, and in good earnest, intended any thing of this as an Objection to Mr. *Barclay's* Scheme, I think nothing in the World could have been more ridiculous.

THE Grace of God, says Mr. *Barclay*, is extended to Mankind in general, sufficient to leave them inexcusable. If this be so, says Mr. *Chubb*, it must afford every one a very good Excuse, because they may plead the want of sufficient Grace. God, says Mr. *Barclay*, never withdraws or suspends his Grace till Men have wickedly abused and sinned it away. Why then, says Mr. *Chubb*, they cannot be to blame: either for this or any thing else; at least they may pretend they are not to blame: and who knows whether they are or no? *Risum teneatis amici!* What he adds about Governours, as if they must not punish and prevent mischievous Actions, nor guard Men's Lives and Properties against them by opposing Force with Force, till they have examined into the Truth and Certainty of his Speculations about Liberty, is so extremely odd, as it here stands, that I need not set it in a pleasanter Light. But Mr. *Chubb* is got so very far into the Nature and Reason of Things, that he seems apt now and then to step a little out of the Nature and Reason of *common Sense*.

Mr. *CHUBB* is very loth to allow any necessary Ground or Reason for depending upon God and praying to him, as the means of obtaining any such Aid or Assistance from him, in consequence of such Dependance and Prayer, which in Point of Happiness we might not have done well enough without. Whether his main Principle, and darling

Notion concerning natural and moral Power and Liberty, will prove this or no, must be left perhaps to farther Consideration and Debate. But in the mean while he must excuse me for not being of his *Religion*.

A N D if he shall think fit to continue the Controversy, I hope he will manage it with more Fairness and Candour, and allow me at least to be sincere in the Argument, how much soever he may suppose me to be mistaken about it. This will be thus a natural piece of Justice, and doing as he would be done by, while Truth and Falshood, Right and Wrong, is the Thing in Debate between us. The Quakers, I am sure, could not at first be any ways particularly concerned in this Business. But yet Mr. *Chubb* might perhaps have justifying Reasons for attacking them in particular, which must be best known to himself, since he has not yet thought fit to produce any such Reasons. But the matter however is now brought out of any private Quarter into the general Province of Reason, where Mr. *Chubb* being in his own proper Sphere and *Element*, the abstract Nature of Things, will be at full Liberty to discuss the Question in his own way.

I SHOULD here, Sir, have put an end to the Trouble I have been giving you and the Publick; only I doubt the common Reader if he should not have a few more *Words* might grudge his *Money*. And therefore having a little spare Room, I shall make some short Remarks upon Mr. *Chubb's* Account of Virtue or Moral Conduct, concerning which I think he is as much mistaken, as about that absolute uncontroulable Liberty,

Liberty, or blind unaccountable *Chance*, which he supposes to be the Ground of it. And by this means these Sheets may possibly be drawn out into a Six-penny Pamphlet, provided the Bookseller will but be pleas'd for his own Interest, to print it upon a moderately small Plate, and in a pretty large Character.

I MUST here then observe in the first place, that Mr. *Chubb* in these *short Reflections on Virtue and Happiness*, has run himself into a most evident and palpable Contradiction.

THE thing which he undertakes to prove, as he informs us in the Title-Page, is, that Selfishness and Benevolence are two distinct and independent Principles of Action. And yet, *that Virtue is solely founded in Benevolence*: Which two things seeming to me so absolutely repugnant and inconsistent, I had the Curiosity to read over very carefully all that he has said upon it.

YOU may here take notice, that by *Selfishness*, tho it has been a word hitherto stigmatized, and always taken in an ill Sense, Mr. *Chubb* means only the natural and necessary, and consequently the reasonable and fit Desire of *personal Happiness*. Which must, in Mr. *Chubb's* own Account, be a Desire at least equally reasonable and fit with *Benevolence* it self, or the Desire of Happiness to others. Which Mr. *Chubb* having supposed and granted, it must necessarily follow, that acting upon the Desire of Personal Happiness, must at least be as reasonable and fit, that is as virtuous, as acting upon the other independent Principle of Benevolence, or the Desire of publick Good. And then how it can possibly be

be true that *Virtue* is *solely* founded in Benevolence, is a thing that I cannot possibly conceive. This I must own appears at present as an Inconsistency to my Understanding; but Mr. *Chubb* is so shrewd an Adversary, that I shall not be here too positive, for fear he should prove, that this manifest Contradiction is a self-evident Truth. I must however do Mr. *Chubb* the Justice as to own, that he has endeavoured to support this Contradiction by a great many others. In order to which he confounds all along the rational regular Desire and Pursuit of personal Happiness, with a vitious unreasonable Selfishness; in which Men are supposed to aim at and pursue some inordinate Gratifications or Pleasures, under a mistaken Notion of Happiness, to the real Injury both of themselves and others. And this Confusion has, I think, thro'out this whole Discourse, led him into one continued Ramble of Absurdity and Contradiction. *Benevolence* may be vitious and irregular as well as Self-Love: That is, tho a Man desires both, yet he may mistake the Happiness of others as well as his own Happiness. And thus a Man's acting upon the Principle of Benevolence under such a mistaken Notion of publick Good, would have no more Virtue or Rewardableness in it than Mr. *Chubb's* Selfishness. He needed therefore but to have taken Benevolence in the irrational and vitious Sense, for Profuseness, vain Glory, &c. And Self-Love in the reasonable, sober, temperate and virtuous Sense, and then he might have turn'd the Tables, and have proved with the same Strength of Reason just the contrary to what he has now.

SOBRIETY,

SOBRIETY, Temperance, Patience, Contentment, and a wise and reasonable Government of a Man's self, under all the different Dispensations and various Occurrences of Providence towards him ; have, I think, been always taken for Virtues till now, and for amiable and rewardable Virtues, as well as Benevolence, Justice, Charity, and the other social Virtues. But Mr. *Chubb* having, it seems, always considered the Desire of Happiness, or *Self-Love*, in the narrow vitious Sense, had plainly a particular Spite against it, and was therefore resolved to exclude it from having any Part or Share in laudable or rewardable Virtue. I must likewise own, that I am somewhat doubtful whether Mr. *Chubb* be not a little mistaken in his other main Principle, that *Selfishness*, as he is pleased to call it, or the necessary natural Desire of *personal Happiness*, and *Benevolence*, or a Desire of Happiness to others, are two distinct and independent Principles of Action.

THE Reasons I have to doubt of this, and which I propose with great Modesty and Diffidence, are chiefly these two.

First, THAT as it appears to me all *Desire*, whatever its *Object* be, must be necessarily and inseparably connected with personal Happiness : And,

Secondly, IT seems to me, that this Desire of personal Happiness, must always take place and prevail whenever it shall be brought into Competition with any other supposed Reason or Principle of Action. 'Tis possible indeed that I may be mistaken in both these, but however I hope I may be allow'd to give

give my Reasons for them even against Mr. Chubb.

First, THEN, Desire being a natural internal Appetite and Sensation of Pain and Uneasiness, till the Good desired is obtain'd; when that desired Good is once obtain'd, the Appetite or Desire gratify'd, and the Pain or Uneasiness removed, we must, by a necessary Law of Nature, be affected with Pleasure in proportion to that antecedent Pain. And the Case will be the same, whether the Object of Desire be either natural or moral, private or publick Good, and whether the Desire be terminated upon another Thing, or another Person. Or, to use Mr. Chubb's own Instance (in which I think he has been a little confused) this Case will be the same, whether a Man or a *Woman* should desire or long for a *Peach*, or to relieve a *Person in Distress*.

IN Case of desiring or longing for a *Peach*, one must needs be under some Pain or Uneasiness, till that Appetite or Desire be gratify'd. And then my Pleasure will be proportional to that Gratification, or to that Pain that is removed by it. If I see a Person in Distress, I am presently, and without Reasoning, struck with Compassion; I sympathize, I suffer with him, till I can either relieve him myself, or see it done by another. And then I sympathize still, I enjoy with him; as I suffered with him before, I share his Pleasure as I did his Pain. In both Cases I am either happy or unhappy, pleas'd or pain'd, in proportion to the Desire and the Gratification of that Desire, whether the Object of it be either natural or moral, private or publick Good. And this I take to be

be a plain Proof, that Desire, and the Gratification of Desire, of what Nature or Kind soever, can never be separated from personal Pain and Pleasure. And here with respect to publick Good, the greater and more intense this Sympathy is, and the more constantly and certainly we act upon it, by so much the more extensively beneficial must its Effects be. And therefore methinks 'tis great Pity, that a Person desiring and intending the Good of others, should not be allow'd the Pleasure of doing that Good, as the natural Motive to, and Reward of, the Action, without destroying his *Virtue*.

BUT if these natural Sympathies are not intended as the natural Motive to, and Reward of, Well-doing, I would fain know to what Purpose they are implanted in human Nature? For in this Case, I think they could only serve to betray us into wrong Measures, and to lay us under the highest possible Temptations and Inducements to act upon wrong Motives, to the utter Destruction of all real Virtue and moral Goodness. Upon which Supposition it seems to me that God himself must have form'd us upon wrong Principles, and have laid the Foundation of Misery and Ruin in our very Constitutions.

BUT if any one had a mind to trifle on farther in this way, he might say with equal appearance of Reason, that Men ought not to regard the natural Appetites of Hunger and Thirst, or the Gratification of them in Eating and Drinking. But that they ought to eat and drink virtuously, upon the abstract Nature and Reason of Things, in a true philosophical Sense. For eating and drink-

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ing

ing being the necessary means of Self-preservation, and Self-preservation being an eternal immutable Obligation in the Nature and Reason of Things, unless they eat and drink upon this Principle, abstracting from the Motives of Hunger and Thirst, they had better never eat and drink at all. Perhaps such a way of Talking here might set People a Laughing, because they have not been so much used to it; but where the same Absurdity has been sanctify'd and authoriz'd by great Names and grave Philosophers, the Jest is turned into Amazement, and People instead of Laughing, only stare and wonder, and cry out that they cannot understand it.

A N D as all Desire, of what Kind and Nature soever, must thus interest its individual Subject, in point of personal Happiness; so in the next place this Desire of personal Happiness must necessarily take place and prevail whenever it shall be brought into Competition with any other Principle, or Reason of Action; while Men are in Society mutually for Happiness, they must desire each others Happiness by the same necessity that they desire their own. And indeed the Desire in this Case is the same, 'tis still the Desire of personal Happiness; only as differently modify'd and specify'd by its different Objects. This will perhaps appear if we do but turn the Tables, and consider whether any such thing as Benevolence can possibly subsist in opposition to the Desire of personal Happiness. And thus if we suppose the Happiness of any two Individuals to be inconsistent, incompatible or repugnant, or so to appear to their Understandings, any two such Individuals must desire, will, and choose

choose each others Misery or Destruction, by the same necessity that they desire, will, and choose personal Happiness. And the thing will be the same if we put the Case still stronger, between any one single Individual and all the rest of the Society. Let the Happiness of any such Individual be incompatible with the Happiness of the rest, or let the Happiness of the one be suppos'd to depend necessarily upon the Misery of the other. And then the Individual must desire, will, and choose the Misery or Destruction of all the rest, and all the rest must equally desire, will, and choose the Misery or Destruction of that Individual. An impartial By-stander or a disinterested Referee, would give it for the Society against the Individual, this being in the nature of the Thing it self the greater Good. But this cannot at all affect the Case with respect to the Persons themselves, who are directly and immediately concern'd in point of *personal Happiness*. This is indeed a Case which cannot in Fact happen, while the World is governed by a wise and righteous Being, or while the general Constitution of Things is suppos'd to be right and good. But yet 'tis sufficient to shew, which way the Determination must be made upon such a Competition, and consequently what must be the one only independent Rule, Reason, or Principle of Action to every human Individual. And this is all that I have brought it for.

I KNOW that a Man may put himself upon great Sufferings and Hardships, or even choose Death itself for the sake of his Friends, or the Good of his Country. In which Case,

if there be a Prospect of a future Reward, that will be sufficient to bear down all Temporal Sufferings: And if there be no such Expectation, yet the hoped for Glory of a Conqueror and Deliverer, or the dreaded Shame and Reproach of a cowardly or villainous Betrayer of his Friends or Country, may be a prepollent Motive to venture every thing, and even to choose an honourable and glorious Death, as infinitely preferable to a shameful and infamous Life. And indeed put the Case where one will, I think it must still be evident, that Men always determine themselves upon the greater apparent Good, and that the Choice of Pain or Misery, considered as such, or upon the whole, must be an impossible Choice; or at least a Choice which no Man ever makes, nor can be oblig'd to make, upon any pretended Reason or Fitness Things.

I SHALL here only make one Remark more upon this Performance, and then I shall have done with it. It relates to what Mr. Chubb has offered, p. 71. with respect to Rewards and Punishments as proposed in the Gospel, which he maintains to be perfectly inconsistent with all proper real Virtue, Desert, or Rewardableness, so far as Men are influenced and governed by them as the Motives of their Actions. 'Tis true he allows that such a way of governing, and applying to Mens Understandings, may serve to several other good Ends and Purposes which he takes notice of, that he might not be thought to be laying aside Christianity; but then, it cannot answer any End or Purpose of Virtue or true Religion.

I CAN-

I CANNOT indeed say, that he has any Design to lay aside Christianity, but yet I think it must be the necessary Consequence of his Principles. Suppose now I should do an Act of pure Kindness to another where I have no By-interest in it, and expect nothing from it but the bare Pleasure and Self-satisfaction of doing Good. Why then says Mr. *Chubb*, your Action can have no Virtue, Desert, Laudableness or Rewardableness in it, if you expect any Pleasure from it, or act upon that Motive, tho that Pleasure should be ever so consistent with, or even conducive to, the publick Good.

WELL, and how then must I act? Why you must act upon the bare naked Reason and Fitness of the Thing. But pray what is this Reasonableness and Fitness of the Thing? What is it which we call reasonable, fit, beautiful and amiable in Things, which so highly pleases and charms us? Is it not their Aptitude or Fitness to excite in us that pure rational Delight, that charming agreeable Sense, that fine and exquisite Pleasure that it gives us? Take away this, and all such acting must be alike indifferent, and no Truth could have any Influence upon the Mind, but all the Beauty, the Charms, the Amiable, the Delectable in Things would be gone; and a Man as to any Power of Reason upon his Mind must be left as indolent as a Stone. But not to insist longer upon this, I think it will follow from another Principle, that in Mr. *Chubb's* Scheme, all Virtue and Rewardableness of Actions must be impossible, and inconsistent with the human Constitution.

tion. He will not allow that there can be any Virtue where a Man acts upon a promised Reward. For this he tells us, *is all fair Traffick or Bargaining; here are Covenants made and executed, from which VIRTUE and REWARD* (he means REWARDABLENESS) are excluded. For as in such a Case a Man is not *Virtuous*, but SELFISH in what he does, so he is not rewarded, but paid a JUST DEBT in what he receives. When God therefore promises to reward Men for well doing, if they take him at his word, and act upon it, they cannot be *Virtuous* or *Rewardable*. And consequently, all such proposed Rewards can really serve only to insnare Men out of their *Virtue*, into a Fool's Paradise.

BUT if discharging an Obligation, and thereby paying a Debt, cannot be a *Virtue*, methinks it must be plain that there can be no such thing as Virtue. For I would ask him, whether every moral Action must not be an *Obligation*, and a Debt due to God and Nature? And whether we are not necessarily and immutably bound to this under the Penalty of forfeiting all that Pleasure and Happiness, which is the natural Sanction or Reward of Virtue it self? Since therefore we can perform no moral Action at all, without discharging an *Obligation*, and paying a Debt, I think it is plain in this Case, that *Virtue* must be an *impossible Thing*. And from hence it must likewise follow, that it will be impossible for God, by any positive Laws under any possible Sanctions, to govern his Creatures as *moral Agents*, or to promote the Cause and Interest

terest of Truth, Reason, and Virtue, by any such Laws. This Scheme, however, is, as I must own, very fair and impartial with respect to Christianity, and natural Religion, because it must sink and destroy them both together.

I HAVE not follow'd Mr. *Chubb* thro' all the Wanderings and dark Windings of his Argument, as thinking it could have serv'd to no good Purpose. But if he can give a clear Answer to what has been here said, I shall take the matter into farther Consideration.

I am, *S I R*,

Bristol May 20.
1728.

Your most obedient

humble Servant,

T. Morgan.

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10 JA 66
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